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Continuities in values and institutions in themselves reveal nothing about 
the direction of social change, although they may provide some indication 
of its speed. The significance of traditional values and institutions lies 
in their interaction with new elements. To understand social change it is 
therefore upon the new elements that one must focus. To do otherwise is like 
running backwards, being able to see where one has come from but not where 
one is going.
This article argues that a crucial new element in contemporary Indonesia 
is the emergence of an urban middle class.1 2 The origins of this class can 
be traced back on the one hand to the civil servants and intelligentsia who 
were the product of liberalized higher education in the late colonial period 
and, on the other hand, to the much older groups of Muslim and Chinese traders. 
The achievement of national independence in 1949 marked the first stage in 
the consolidation of this new class. After the hiatus of "Guided Democracy" 
(1959-65), the second stage began with the establishment of the "New Order" 
government in 1966. The restoration of political stability and the unprecedented 
prosperity of the oil boom of the 1970s has enabled this middle class to flourish.
1. This article has been written in fits and starts over about three years 
and mainly while I have been a Visitor in the Department of Economics, Research 
School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University. For comments 
on earlier drafts I am most grateful to Anne Booth, Chris Manning, Peter McCawley, 
David Penny, Tony Reid, and Thee Kian Wie. I have also benefited from the 
very stimulating discussion which followed my presentation of a seminar on 
this topic for the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies at Monash University 
in April 1982, and from the fair and constructive criticisms of the referees.
2. This was an issue of great interest (at least to foreigners) in the early 
years of independence, when it was still expected that Indonesia would evolve as 
a liberal democracy. It was the focus of the classic monograph by Robert van 
Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1960) 
as well as J. M. van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, 2 vols. (Jakarta: 
Masa Baru, 1954 and 1957). Since then the focus on the "elite" seems to have 
blinded social scientists to its middle-class nature. A rare exception is 
Dan Lev in his studies of Indonesian lawyers, for example "Origins of the 
Indonesian Advocacy," Indonesia 21 (April 1976): 135-70 (esp. pp. 160-64).
J. A. C. Mackie, "Indonesia since 1945: Problems of Interpretation" in Contemporary 
Indonesia: Political Dimensions (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University, 1979) recognizes 
the importance of the middle class but refers to it only in passing.
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It is remarkable that no analysis of the New Order has yet taken account of 
this phenomenon.
One important consequence of the consolidation of a middle class has been 
a changing concept of what constitutes equity. In precolonial Java the people 
claimed, and rulers acknowledged, a right to an adequate subsistence. In 
other words, the primary concern was with absolute poverty. This was also 
at the root of the Ethical Policy in the late colonial period. The emergence 
of a nascent Indonesian middle class was accompanied by an intellectual commitment 
to socialism and equality, which later became the ideological basis of "Guided 
Democracy." In other words, the emphasis shifted to a concern with relative 
inequality. Although the New Order government has looked with disfavor upon 
socialism, under popular pressure it adopted a commitment to equality (pemerataan) 
as a state objective which was written into the Third Five Year Plan (Repelita 
III, 1979-84). The new fashion of "Basic Needs" now espoused by international 
agencies such as the World Bank, however, harks back to the traditional ideal 
of an adequate subsistence. Thus, not only is there a lively debate both 
internationally and within Indonesia over development and equity, but also 
the interpretation of equity is itself in a state of flux.
This article is an attempt to explore the relationship between the rise 
of a middle class and the changing concept of equity, and its relevance to 
economic policy. The first section considers the interpretation of the term 
"middle class." This is followed by an extended discussion of the concept 
of equity in precolonial Java. The three succeeding sections review the link 
between equity goals and economic policy in the twentieth century: first under 
the Ethical Policy of the late colonial period (1901—42); then after independence 
and during the subsequent period of Guided Democracy (1959-65)? and finally 
under the New Order. The conclusion draws out some implications of the analysis.
The Middle Class
The term "middle class" means different things to different people. As 
the term is of European origin, its usage in this article may be clarified 
by some brief reference to that context. In feudal European society, which 
was predominantly rural, there was no middle class. Apart from the Church, 
there was only a land-holding upper class and the common people. A monied class 
of traders and artisans, whose wealth was derived from commerce rather than 
land, existed outside feudal society, as reflected in the French word "bourgeois" 
(townsman). * Marx borrowed the term "bourgeoisie," with its connotations 
of money and wealth, to denote the owners of the means of production. He 
was thereby able to define mature capitalist society, like feudal society, 
as having only two basic classes. Feudal society was polarized between those 
who held land and those who did not, whereas capitalist society, according 
to Marx, was polarized between those who owned the means of production and 
those who did not. By this intellectual sleight there was, in theory, still 
no middle class. The term "middle class" can be used with its commonsense 
English, Dutch, or German meaning, however, to identify a group distinct from 
either an upper class of feudal origin, holding power and wealth by virtue 
of birth, or a lower class of peasants and workers, lacking power, wealth, 
and even education. This middle class has education, some wealth, and whatever 3
3. Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade, 
trans. Frank D. Halsey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948) is still 
an excellent discussion of this point.
Table 1. Average Monthly Expenditure by Main Categories, Urban Java (1978)
Expenditure Group (Rp/month)
Expenditure < 2,000 2-2,999 3-3,999 4-4,999 5-5,999 6-7,999 8-9,999 10-14,999 l  15,000 Av.
Item 2.1 7.5 12.2 9.3 9.7 16.6 10.5 15.5 16.6 100%
Basic Starches8 775 1,048 1,211 1,265 1,317 1,362 1,398 1,495 1,679 1,370
Other Food*3 486 932 1,396 1,881 2,422 3,144 4,058 5,299 9,338 3,982
Clothing 33 67 122 184 215 297 382 526 1,139 419
Housing0 245 367 534 781 973 1,276 1,778 2,621 8,138 2,423
Taxes & Insurance 7 17 25 35 59 81 125 223 658 184
Other 69 122 230 377 485 815 1,163 1,957 6,388 1,744
Total (Non-food) 354 573 911 1,377 1,732 2,469 3,448 5,327 16,323 4,770
TOTAL 1,615 2,553 3,518 4,523 5,471 6,975 8,904 12,121 27,340 10,122
a. Includes cassava.
b. Includes beverages, cigarettes.
c. Includes fuel, light, and water.
SOURCE: Biro Pusat Statistik, Survey Soalal Ekonomi NaaionaL: Tahap Ke-Liwa (Jakarta, 1878).
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power it has been able to win from the aristocracy. In all three respects, 
however, the definition of the middle class is a residual one. Where the 
middle class can be identified sui generis is in terms of lifestyles and values. 
These are best described, unpejoratively and with an urban connotation, as 
’’bourgeois." In this regard it is still meaningful to talk of a middle class, 
even though in most Western democracies (including Japan) it has absorbed 
the upper class, stripped of its power and economic privileges, and ceased 
to be "middle" in any strict sense.
Although it has often been said that in Indonesia there is no middle class 
but only a wealthy elite on the one hand and a poverty-stricken mass on the other, 
this is too simple a view. The new Indonesian elite is a middle-class/bourgeois 
e lite . There is no longer an upper class. The hereditary aristocracy has 
ceased to be of any consequence. Although the leaders of the Armed Forces 
have sought in the doctrine of dwi fungsi (dual function) to legitimize their 
position as trustees for, and natural rulers of, the people, they hardly constitute 
a new upper class. Reform of the Armed Forces along rational bureaucratic lines, 
with entrance to the officer corps at least partly on the basis of educational 
performance, has ensured that Armed Forces’ officers will remain closely tied 
to the middle class and not in the foreseeable future become a hereditary 
caste. The extravagant lifestyles of leaders of the Armed Forces, far from 
being aristocratic, are typically nouveau riche, displaying to the point of 
caricature the material aspirations of the middle class. Their conspicuous 
consumption is unsoftened by any trace of noblesse oblige. In terms of occupation 
and status, wealth and power, the Indonesian middle class is amorphous: civil 
servants (including teachers and academics), professionals such as engineers, 
doctors, lawyers, journalists, airline pilots, and business executives, other 
"white collar" workers, and, of course, employers. Lifestyle and attitudes, 
however, provide the underlying coherence of an urban middle-class culture. 
It is most evident in Jakarta but, being diffused throughout the country by 
the powerful media of education, television, and magazines, is becoming the 
national culture.
With regard to material lifestyles, some indication of the size of the 
middle class can be gained from the expenditure data in Table 1. Definitely 
middle class are the 16.6 percent of individuals in urban Java whose expenditures 
in 1978 were greater than Rp 15,000 per month. The distribution of their 
expenditure is also revealing. While their expenditure on staple starches 
was not markedly above average, it was very much higher in the case of "other 
food" (i.e ., including "luxury" items such as meat, cheese, and alcoholic 
beverages), housing, and "other" (i.e., mainly consumer durables). That the 
middle class is an essentially urban phenomenon is shown by the fact that 
only 1.1 percent of those in rural areas had expenditures greater than Rp 15,000, 
and much of this was probably accounted for not by rich farmers but by the 
spillover of urban-based activity into rural zones.4
The importance of consumer durables in the expenditure patterns of the 
urban middle class is supported by data on ownership of consumption assets. 
Based on the careful tabulations of Roger Downey, Table 2 shows the access 
of those in urban areas by socioeconomic category to the most valuable consumer 
items—cars, motorcycles, television  sets, stereo sets, and refrigerators.
4. This is apparent from the work of Roger Downey, who has classified "rural" 
dwellers by socioeconomic category: "Indonesian Inequality" (PhD dissertation, 
Cornell University, 1983).
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Table 2. Access to Major Consumar Durables by Socioeconomic Group (Urban) 
(Percentage of Individuals mlth regular access)
Car Motorcycle TV Refrig Stereo
Self-employed professionals 17.2 22.6 34.1 17.9 14.3
Menagers and Supervisors 15.4 36.6 37.7 16.7 13.2
Military 13.7 37.9 36.4 12.2 9.3
Professionals (non-teachers] 12.2 34.8 36.9 15.3 11.9
Employers 12.1 27.7 31.2 14.7 9.9
Teachers 5.9 32.6 23.1 7.6 7.1
Higher Clerical and Sales 5.7 29.5 30.3 9.2 8.7
Other Self-employed 2.9 9.3 9.8 3.2 2.8
Other Clerical and Sales 1.8 9.7 10.5 3.0 3.1
Manual Workers 1.3 5.8 7.1 1.6 2.0
SOURCE: Roger Downey* "Indonesian Inequality" (PhD dissertation* Cornell University* 1983).
As might be expected, self-employed professionals, managers and supervisors, 
m ilitary, professionals (excluding teachers), employers, teachers, and higher 
clerical and sales personnel all have much better access to these goods than 
other self-employed (petty traders, etc.), lower clerical, sales and service 
personnel, and, especially, manual workers, even though some individuals in 
the latter categories earned sufficient income to appear to be on the fringe 
of the middle class. By contrast, only the tiny group of farmers owning more 
than 5 hectares had a level of access to consumer durables approaching even 
that of manual workers in urban areas.
Membership of the middle class is not, however, just a matter of levels 
of income and expenditure. It is sharply defined by social behavior, reflecting 
what may be described as the privatization of the means of consumption. This 
is readily apparent from the contrast between middle-class and kampung society. * 
In the latter, the urban society of the common people, consumption assets 
such as transistors, bicycles, and crockery are shared ("borrowed"), as well 
as money, and are to some extent communal property. A refusal to lend something 
is regarded as antisocial. Houses are left open to anyone who wants to drop 
in or walk through. What one has is a matter of common knowledge. It is 
the social pressure to share possessions, as well as the lack of privacy, 
that tends to drive the more prosperous out of the kampung, either physically 
or socially. * Their houses are likely to face away from the kampung onto 56
5. Good descriptions of kampung society are John Sullivan, Back Alley Neighbour­
hood: Kampung as Urban Community in Y ogyakarta, Working Paper No. 22 (Clayton, 
Vic.: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1980), and Patrick 
Guinness, "Rukun Kampung: Social Relations in Urban Yogyakarta" (PhD dissertation, 
Australian National University, 1981).
6. Sullivan, Back A lley  Neighbourhood, refers to the distinction between 
those who are "in" and those who are "of" the kampung.
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the street and the amorphous outside world. In order to establish and defend 
their exclusive access to the goods they have purchased, their doors are likely 
to be locked and their windows barred.7 89 Once a family has fled the orbit 
of kampung society, the only constraint upon its level of consumption is its 
own income, and the ever-present threat of theft. The essential selfishness 
of middle-class consumption also stands out in comparison with the old aristocracy: 
there is no acknowledgment of noblesse oblige.
To avoid the many ambiguities of the terms "middle class" and "bourgeois" 
it might therefore be less confusing to refer instead to a "consumer class." If 
the term were understood to refer not to the essential consumption of necessities, 
which is common to all, but the inessential/excess/luxury consumption which 
is enjoyed only by the economically privileged, then it would be both specific 
and workable. To the extent that lifestyles can be quantified in terms of 
expenditure data and the ownership of consumption assets, it would also be 
measurable. But, as the rest of this article is concerned to argue, values 
also matter. It is more meaningful to speak of values and attitudes which 
are bourgeois or middle class than "consumer class.” I shall therefore willfully 
persist in using the former, but according to common usage and not as precise 
social science terms.
Equity in Traditional Java
The kingdoms of precolonial Java such as Majapahit and Mataram have aptly 
been described as "agrarian empires."* Their economic base was wet-rice agricul­
ture. Technology was premodern but, nevertheless, highly productive. With 
sufficient land, irrigation, and water buffalo, but without improved seeds 
or fertilizers, an average family could produce each year up to 2 tons of 
milled rice equivalent, including the supplementary produce of the house garden. * 
In theory, they could surrender almost half of the rice harvest in taxes and 
still be provided with an adequate subsistence. The economy was therefore 
able to generate an economic surplus to support a large ruling class. In the 
absence of technical progress, however, the tax base could be increased only 
by proportionate increases in inputs of land and labor. Good virgin land was 
plentiful. Labor would seem to have been the scarce factor of production. 
One of the major aims of statecraft was therefore to maximize the size of 
the population under a ruler’s jurisdiction. New settlement and irrigation 
works were important means to this end. A wise ruler thereby increased his 
tax base in the form both of corvde labor and of rice. From these flowed 
the splendor of his court and the might of his army.10
7. Guinness, "Rukun Kampung," offers a good insight into the tensions between 
the kampung dwellers (orang kampung) and those better-off people whose houses 
face onto the street (orang pinggir jalan).
8. This concept can be traced back, via Wittfogel and Weber, to Marx’s "Asiatic 
mode of production." Marian Sawyer, Marxism and the Question of the Asiatic 
Mode of Production (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977) is a good recent historiography.
9. David H. Penny, "Some Aspects of the Problem of Overpopulation in Rural 
Java" (mimeo, 1973) and Anne Booth, "Accommodating a Growing Population in 
Javanese Agricu lture," Seminar Paper (Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, March 1983).
10. Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java (Ithaca: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1973) is the best study of government in traditional 
Java, applying specifically to the Mataram period.
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In such a society, equity was the fundamental "economic" problem. The 
level of output was determined primarily by the extent of wet-rice agriculture, 
which, in turn, was determined by the size of the population. Apart from some 
trade, the economic base was narrow and technology almost static, so that the 
allocation of resources was straightforward. There was scope for growth in 
the size of the economy, but not in output per capita.11 123 The distribution 
of output, however, was complex. It can best be understood in two stages. 
The first stage was the division of output between surplus and subsistence, 
which corresponded to the basic social distinction between rulers (wong gede) 
and ruled (wong c ilik ). This involves what has been referred to by Scott 
as the "moral economy" of the peasant.11 Scott argues compellingly that the 
maintenance of some minimum satisfactory level of subsistence is the basis 
of peasants' behavior and their attitude toward the ruling class. The limitation 
of his argument is that he never goes beyond subsistence as a concept to specify, 
from the peasant viewpoint, some standard of livelihood. As far as Scott 
is concerned, subsistence is what it is. If the level of subsistence cannot 
be specified then neither can the size of the economic surplus. It is suggested 
below that, in the case of Java at least, there is a way out of this impasse. 
Once a surplus has been extracted, the second stage of the process is its 
distribution among members of the ruling class. This involves the workings 
of what Weber called the "patrimonial state."
Javanese peasants have a fairly precise ideal of what constitutes an adequate 
subsistence. Their term is cukupan, which literally translated means "enough." 
David Penny and Masri Singarimbun, the first authors to have attempted to 
apply the concept in economic analysis, argue that cukupan represents a real 
income of 1200 kilograms of milled rice equivalent per family per year.19 
This is sufficient for a family of two adults and three children to eat rice 
all year round with a few side dishes, to be simply but respectably dressed 
on formal occasions, to be simply housed by modest village standards, and 
to be able to save a small amount for security and to cover future life-cycle 
ceremonies. "Cukupan" encompasses but transcends the basic biological requirements 
to sustain life. About half of this quantity of milled rice equivalent would 
be required to feed a family of five people at the rate of 120 kilograms per 
person per year, which would provide about 75 percent of minimum daily requirements 
of 1600 calories. Although the large part of the balance of 1200 kilograms 
of milled rice equivalent is surplus in strictly  nutritional terms, it is 
not surplus in social terms. Being respectably clothed on formal occasions, 
living in a proper house, and thereby being able to hold and participate in 
the life-cycle ceremonies which mark the tempo of village life are not luxuries, 
but basic to man's identity as a social being. The third element of the concept 
of cukupan is a sufficient margin to provide security against the inevitable,
11. See Booth, "Accommodating a Growing Population," for a discussion of 
"static expansion" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
There is no reason to believe that the situation was any different in earlier 
periods.
12. James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1976). His argument draws upon the substantial literature of peasant 
economics, of which Alexander V. Chayanov, The Theory of Peasant Economy, 
ed. Daniel Thorner, Basile Kerblay, and R. B. F. Smith (Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 
1966) has been particularly influential.
13. David H. Penny and Masri Singarimbun, Population and Poverty in Rural 
Java (Ithaca: N.Y. State College of Agriculture, Cornell University, 1973).
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but unpredictable, fluctuations in harvests. Scott has documented for Burma 
and Vietnam, and there is ample evidence from elsewhere in Asia, the vulnerability 
of the peasantry when such insurance can no longer be provided from its own 
resources. In Java, where harvests are fairly reliable, the margin for insurance 
seems to have been fairly small. The importance of the concept of cukupan 
is not that peasants recognize food, social life, and security as basic to 
man's existence, but that they can specify quite closely the minimum level 
of real income which enables those needs to be met.
Penny and Singarimbun argue that the meaning given to cukupan has not 
changed for a long time. There has been no "revolution of rising expectations":
The real level of living implied has not changed with the advent 
of roads and railways, which opened new market opportunities last 
century; with the arrival of modern irrigation, from early in 
the twentieth century; or following the arrival of good rice seeds, 
fe r t il iz e r  and pesticides, which started in the 1930s and which 
have been pushed quite hard since the mid 1950s and particularly 
since 1968 in the so-called Green Revolution.14 15
Moreover, while the concept of cukupan predates the market economy, far from 
turning the concept into an anachronism, the evolution of the market economy 
has in fact strengthened it. In the loose translation of cukupan as an "adequate 
subsistence," the emphasis falls as much upon "subsistence" as upon "adequate." 
The vital importance of owning enough land to provide 1200 kilograms of milled 
rice equivalent per annum is that a peasant is thereby not dependent upon 
the market to gain a livelihood. While he may participate in the market economy 
as a means of supplementing his income by the exchange of surplus production, 
this participation is at his own discretion. The market is his vent for the 
surplus, which is his cushion against hard times. Those who do not have enough 
land to provide an adequate subsistence, however, are forced to participate 
in the market economy. They may exchange superior foods such as rice, fruit, 
eggs, or chickens for inferior carbohydrates such as maize or cassava; they 
may engage in less productive income-earning activities, such as foraging 
for grass or firewood or making coconut sugar; they may become wage laborers 
or migrate to the cities. In colonial times taxes were imposed upon the rural 
population to create an artificial scarcity that would compel the release 
for the market of land and labor and their produce. The experience of the 
rural Javanese has therefore inclined them to view the market with grave suspicion 
and to see their participation not as a means to greater prosperity but as 
both consequence and cause of their poverty. As Penny and Singarimbun have 
shown by cross-sectional analysis of one Javanese village, participation in 
the market economy is greatest for farmers with little  or no land, or for 
farmers who have more than enough land to be cukupan. Those who have just 
enough land to be self-sufficient try to remain independent of the market.14
While the standard of cukupan has not been inflated by rising expectations, 
neither has it been eroded by worsening poverty. In the 1960s, when food
14. Penny and Singarimbun, Population and Poverty, p. 3. This may, however, 
be becoming less true. Since the late 1970s a "revolution of rising expectations" 
does seem to have reached village Java.
15. Ibid. See also David H. Penny and M. Ginting, "House Gardens: A Last 
Resort?" in Indonesia: Dualism, Growth and Poverty, ed. Ross Garnaut and Peter 
McCawley (Canberra: Australian National University, 1980), esp. pp. 492-93. 
This also may be becoming less true. (See note 14 above.)
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crop yields stagnated in the face of a faster than 2 percent annual increase 
in population, there was rural poverty unprecedented but for the harsh interlude 
of the Japanese occupation. Napitupulu coined the term "invisible hunger" 
to describe the malnutrition which had become chronic in much of rural Java.14 
Based on fieldwork carried out in 1969, Penny and Singarimbun documented the 
stark reality of poverty at the village leve l.16 7 18 Yet, while poor villagers 
cut to the bone the real income upon which they could survive, they appear 
not to have compromised their ideal of what constituted an adequate subsistence. 
The tenacity of the ideal attests that it is rooted in a concept of equity 
which is historically based. It is a standard which the common people regard 
as having obtained in former times and one to which legitimately they can 
still aspire.
On its own, however, an adequate subsistence is only half a concept. Its 
logical complement is economic surplus, the balance of output after basic needs 
have been satisfied.12 The nature and origins of economic surplus can best be 
understood by comparison between the productivity of agriculture on the frontier 
and in the heartland. The frontier is defined by two main characteristics. 
First, there is a large supply of uncultivated land. Second, no supravillage 
government has effective authority to impose significant taxes upon the output. 
These conditions applied in parts of Java until well into the nineteenth century, 
and still apply today in many parts of the Outer Islands. Penny has shown 
that under such conditions Javanese peasants took up only so much land as 
required to produce little  more than an adequate subsistence (1200 kg/mre).19 20
Without buffalo or irrigation and using unimproved seeds without fertilizer 
on rainfed fields, the amount of land required is 0.7 hectares of ricefield 
and 0.3 hectares of house garden to produce 900 kg and 300 kg respectively 
of milled rice equivalent. This also happens to be about the maximum area 
which a family can cultivate using only hand tools. Under these circumstances 
peasants produce an adequate subsistence for themselves but no more. Except 
perhaps for village taxes, there is no economic surplus.
In the heartland of Mataram, however, Moertono has stated that the ruler 
levied tax on the rice harvest at a nominal rate of 40 percent. *° Even allowing 
that the effective rate was probably much less than 40 percent, it would still 
appear at first sight that the land tax, not to mention the corvde and various 
other requisitions, must have cut heavily into the real income of the peasantry.21 
The crucial difference between the frontier and the heartland, however, was
16. Napitupulu, "Hunger in Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 
9 (February 1968).
17. Penny and Singarimbun, Population and Poverty.
18. The concept of economic surplus was developed by Baran in the Marxist 
tradition to refer to the difference between potential production and essential 
consumption. See Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (London: Penguin, 
1973).
19. David H. Penny, "The Transition from Subsistence to Commercial Family 
Farming in North Sumatra" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1964).
20. Moertono, State and Statecraft, p. 14. See also Appendix I.
21. A. van der Kraan, Conquest, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, ASAA Monograph 
(Singapore: Heinemann, 1980) includes a fascinating study of precolonial and 
colonial tax systems on the island of Lombok which shows that, before colonial 
rule, actual rates of land tax were much lower than nominal rates.
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that in the latter irrigation and the use of buffaloes more than doubled the 
output of wet rice agriculture—although the output of house gardens seems 
to have remained unchanged. In the heartland, a peasant family using best 
practice premodern technology, including double-cropping, could produce more 
than 2000 kilograms of milled rice equivalent per hectare per annum.** Rather 
than being at the expense of the adequate subsistence of the peasantry, the 
land tax therefore seems to have represented, more or less, the additional 
production resulting from the provision of irrigation. In other words, the 
growth in output brought about by state intervention does not seem to have 
improved the material well being of village society so much as providing the 
means for the aggrandizement of the state.**
With regard to the distribution of economic surplus, Ben Anderson and 
Harold Crouch have both argued that traditional Java fits the Weberian model 
of the patrimonial state.*4 Unlike the situation in the West, where the holders 
of political power are now expected to derive no greater benefit from office 
than their salary and perquisites, in patrimonial societies a position takes 
the form of a benefice. The holder is expected to extract personal income 
to maintain a leve l of consumption consistent with his status, reflecting 
in turn his proximity to the source of power. At the same time, he is expected 
to be generous in gifts to his patron and to distribute largesse among his own 
clients. No stigma attaches to luxury consumption as such. Nor was there any 
responsibility to save or invest. The main danger lay in living above one’s 
station, with the consequences attendant upon those guilty of fese majesty. 
In the often intrigue-ridden courts of traditional Java, this could be a matter 
of fine judgment. The distribution of economic surplus was therefore both a 
means of confirming the status hierarchy and a form of competition within it. 
Far from being regarded as inequitable, inequality was the very essence of 
the system.
So far the argument has been that in traditional Java the peasantry held 
to an ideal of an adequate subsistence, and that this absolute standard defined 
the most that might legitimately be extracted from their output as economic 
surplus. It remains to consider whether this was a right recognized by rulers 
and one which was actually enjoyed. Although Scott defines subsistence narrowly 
in terms only of physical needs, he nevertheless puts the case very succinctly:
The operating assumption of the "right to subsistence" is that all 
members of the community have a presumptive right to a living so far 
as village resources will allow. This subsistence claim is morally 
based on the common notion of a hierarchy of human needs, with the 
means for physical survival naturally taking priority over all other 234
22. Penny, "Some Aspects of the Problem of Overpopulation," and Booth, Accom­
modating a Growing Population.
23. This conclusion is reminiscent of Wittfogel’s thesis of China’s "hydraulic 
society." What needs to be determined, however, is the extent to which irrigation 
was attributable to state rather than village initiative and resources. In 
the ease of Java see N. C. van Setten van der Meer, Saw ah Cultivation in Ancient 
Java (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979).
24. Benedict Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Culture 
and Po litics  in Indonesia, ed. Claire Holt et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1972), and Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia," 
World Politics 31, 4 (July 1979).
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claims to v illage  wealth. . . . This right is surely the minimal 
claim that an individual makes on his society and it is perhaps for 
this reason that it has such moral force.**
In the case of Java, at least, Anderson would disagree:
Traditional thought clearly did not allow for any form of social 
contract or conceptualized system of mutual obligations. . . . Any 
such system would have had to admit a formal reciprocity in political 
relationships fundamentally alien to Javanese thinking.
This very strong statement is later somewhat qualified:
It would nonetheless be a mistake to infer . . . that there is no 
inherent sense of obligation and responsibility in the traditional 
Javanese world-view. But this sense of obligation was and is an 
obligation to Power itse lf . . .  to suppose that the behavior 
required of the ruler is predicated on the stated or unstated 
needs of his subjects would be an error. The ruler must behave 
properly or his Power will ebb and vanish, and with it the good 
ordering and smoothness of the social system.**
While in strictly formal terms this may be true, the interpretation is nevertheless 
based upon a theoretical rather than a practical ruling class view of politics. 
Scott's general observations are again pertinent:
. . .  in all but the most coercive systems of rural class relation­
ships, there is some pattern of reciprocity, some pattern of rights, 
which peasants claim as the duty of those who control scarce 
resources. Such normative traditions are reflected in popular 
conceptions of what constitutes the "good" lord, the just king, 
the decent landlord.*7
Moertono would seem to confirm that under normal circumstances the relations 
between rulers and ruled in Java were hardly more coercive than elsewhere. **
In Java, as elsewhere, an adequate subsistence seems to have been seen 
as one of three basic rights. The other two were peace and order, and justice. *» 
To talk of these as "rights" is not, of course, to imply that they were necessarily 
enjoyed. No doubt the contrary was often the case. Sunan Amangkurat I (1646-77) 
is notorious for his lofty disavowal of concern for the welfare of his subjects.25 678930 
He was not, however, regarded as a model Javanese ruler. Peace, justice, 
and an adequate subsistence were rights in the sense that the common people
25. Scott, Moral Economy, pp. 176-77.
26. Anderson, "Idea of Power," pp. 47, 52.
27. Scott, Moral Economy, p. 181,
28. Moertono, State and Statecraft, ch. 2, esp. pp. 25-26.
29. Justice (keadilan) might be defined as the right for grievances to be 
heard and dealt with wisely. The common people had access to two institutions, 
that of nggogol (procession) and that of pepe (sitting in the sun in the square 
before the palace). See ibid., p. 76.
30. See D. H. Burger, Structural Changes in Javanese Society: The Supra-Village 
Sphere (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1956), p. 8.
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fe lt entitled to expect them of a wise and powerful ruler.*1 If those rights 
were not respected the people had the option to flee or, in the ultimate extremity, 
to rebel against unbearable oppression. The former, more in the nature of 
an individual act, was obviously very common and has been widely reported. 
As the Dutch found after 1830 in the administration of the Cultivation System, 
when the burden became too heavy, the people melted away. As long as there 
still existed in Java good uncultivated land more or less beyond the reach 
of rulers and taxation, there was some check upon the degree of exploitation. 
Without irrigation  or water buffalo families could, as already explained, 
s till obtain an adequate subsistence from land hacked out of the jungle. 
The ideal of an adequate subsistence was therefore still accessible, at least 
for the enterprising.
Peasant revolts were nevertheless a recurrent phenomenon. As Sartono 
has argued,
The sporadic agrarian uprisings of the past two centuries, all, 
whatever their stated objectives, expressed a fundamental protest 
against the existing conditions in rural life .**
He also argues that there is no reason to believe that revolts have been confined 
to the colonial era for which records are avaiable. One might expect, however, 
that revolts would have become more frequent as the nineteenth century wore 
on, for reasons other than the trauma of colonial rule. Unoccupied land became 
more scarce and the authority of the colonial government extended relentlessly. 
By the end of the century the frontier was rapidly disappearing. Land holdings 
fragmented and output per capita began to fall, while the efficiency of tax 
collection improved. * * As the ideal of an adequate subsistence receded from 
grasp, at least in more densely populated areas, it would have been surprising 
if the appeal of messianic leaders had not increased.
The problem, which seems to have become more widespread during the nineteenth 
century, is, therefore, not that the Javanese and colonial governments taxed 
away the economic surplus, but that they taxed away more than the economic 
surplus. In terms of "moral economy," the margin between the actual level 
of peasant consumption and the level which would have provided an adequate 
subsistence was not legitimately part of the economic surplus. Extension 
of the tax base, mainly through more "efficient" administration, to include 
a part of subsistence income was facilitated by the changing balance of power 
between rulers and ruled. The peasantry lost their formerly de facto veto 
power over the distribution of income, and the leverage of the colonial government 
greatly increased. As economic surplus per capita produced by wet-rice agriculture 
declined, the state was better able to defend its claims to the output than 
the peasantry were able to defend their right to an adequate subsistence.*4 3124
31. Wayang would seem to have played an important part in legitimizing and 
reinforcing those rights.
32. Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism in Java," in Culture and Politics, 
p. 72.
33. Van der Kraan, Conquest, Colonialism, gives a clear picture of how this 
process occurred in Lombok.
34. As Scott (Moral Economy, p. 7) aptly remarks: "The essential question 
is who stabilizes his income at whose expense."
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The Ethical Policy (1901-42) *5
Although Dutch colonial rule has been widely condemned as a period of 
oppression and exploitation, in some important respects the Dutch seem to 
have acted very much like a traditional Javanese government. Indeed, after 
1900 Dutch rule seems, by traditional Javanese standards, to have been quite 
enlightened. In particular, there was a systematic attempt to uphold the 
people's basic rights of peace, justice, and an adequate subsistence. Colonial 
rule remained, of course, fundamentally exploitive. The aim of the Ethical 
Policy—or Welfare Policy as it later became known—was not to transform the 
social order but to preserve it. But traditional Javanese government was 
also exploitive. The common people expected nothing else. For enlightened 
exploitation they could be grateful.
Peace and order (rust en orde) was undoubtedly the main benefit which 
the people of Java received from the final century of colonial rule. Precolonial 
Java was not a peaceful place, and Schrieke has vividly described the destruction 
wrought by traditional warfare. As Ricklefs has convincingly argued, the 
Dutch presence in Java was initially destabilizing and probably made internecine 
warfare more frequent. The bitter Java War of 1825-30 could be attributed 
directly to colonial policy.** After 1830, however, the Pax Neerlandica lasted 
for more than a century, probably the longest period of continuous peace ever 
known. This peace was certainly not enforced for the benefit of the people, 
but they did benefit nonetheless. Perhaps the best reflection of this was 
the steady growth in population, although in the long run this was to be a 
mixed blessing.
With regard to justice, heroic efforts were made to codify adat (customary) 
law as a legal system for the common people.*7 In the end it turned out to 
be a blind alley. Because of the stigma that adat law applied to the "natives" 
as second-class citizens while the colonial elite enjoyed the privileges of 
Western law, the maintenance of separate legal systems for rulers and ruled 
did not formally survive independence. Deprived of the formal protection 
of codified adat law but still without proper access to Western law, the common 
people have thereby been left to the benevolence of arbitrary authority.
The mainspring of the Ethical Policy was concern with the diminishing welfare 
(jnindere welvaart) of the Javanese people. The "debt of honor" was, in effect, 3567
35. Although much has been written on the Ethical Policy, the literature 
has been biased towards its politics rather than its economics. Notable exceptions 
are John S. Furnivall, Netherlands Indies: A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1939), A. Jonkers, Het Welvaartzorg in Indonesie 
(The Hague: van Hoeve, 1948), and P. Creutzberg, ed., Het Ekonomisch Beleid 
in Nederlandsch-Indie, 4 vols. (Groningen: Wolters & Noordhoff, 1971-75). 
This last is a mine of source material.
36. B. Schrieke, Ruler and Realm in Early Java: Indonesian Sociological Studies, 
Part I I  (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1959), esp. pp. 143-52; Merle C. Ricklefs, 
Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1747-1792 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1974); and P. B. R. Carey, ed. and trans., Babad Dipanegara. An Account of 
the Outbreak of the Java War (1825-30) (Kuala Lumpur: Art Printers, 1981).
37. These efforts are identified with the "Leiden School" and the work of 
Van Vollenhoven in particular.
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to restore to the people the means to an adequate subsistence.3* Many of 
the measures taken would have met with the approval of any enlightened Javanese 
ruler. Irrigation  and resettlement (transmigration) were sound physiocratic 
policies. The Dutch devoted more attention to roads, railways, telegraphs, 
and post offices, but the strategic advantages to be gained from good communi­
cations were at least understood in precolonial Java. Unfortunately, although 
these measures must have slowed down the decline in living standards, they 
were not sufficient generally to restore an adequate subsistence. Had such 
measures been implemented a century earlier when population pressure on the 
land was less acute, they would no doubt have yielded more favorable results. 
It  was not altogether the fault of the Dutch that Java "filled up" during 
the course of the nineteenth century, even though the Pax Neerlandica had 
allowed the population to grow more steadily than would otherwise have been 
the case. *»
Despite a similarity of means, however, in conception the Ethical Policy 
was fundamentally different from a modern Development Policy. There was no 
objective of a sustained long-term improvement in living standards. As stated 
above, the main goal was the more modest one of restoring to the peasantry 
the means to an adequate subsistence. Proclamation of the Ethical Policy 
amounted to acknowledgment that an adequate subsistence was a basic right. 
The Dutch did not forgo their claim to the economic surplus, but implicitly 
recognized that they had expropriated more than the economic surplus and thereby 
infringed this right of subsistence. The more telling criticism that can 
be made of the Ethical Policy is not that the Dutch were half-hearted in their 
efforts to raise agricultural productivity but that they balked at any radical 
lightening of the tax burden on the people. Anne Booth has shown for the 
period 1926-39 that, excluding subsistence consumption from the tax base and 
allowing for some progressivity, the tax burden upon the indigenous population 
was consistently higher than upon the non-Indonesian population.38 940 Moreover, 
during the Depression of the 1930s, the tax burden upon the indigenous population 
increased sharply and disproportionately. This criticism merely confirms, 
however, that the Ethical Policy presupposed a basic social distinction between 
rulers and ruled. Notwithstanding the liberal origins of the Policy, it reflected 
a colonial view of equity which coincided remarkably closely with that of
38. The data are not available to establish whether there was in fact a steady 
decline in the level of welfare in the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
The Ethical Policy was, however, based on this premise, and the commission of 
enquiry which produced a series of reports between 1904 and 1914 was known as 
the Mindere Welvaart Commissie. Summarizing the results of this enquiry in 1914, 
Hasselman concluded that the level of welfare had declined in some areas of Java 
but that this was not a general phenomenon. See C. J. Hasselman, "General Survey 
of the Results of the Investigation into Economic Prosperity in Java and Madura," 
in Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism, 1830-1941, 
ed. C. Penders (St. Lucias Queensland University Press, 1977). The term "debt 
of honor" was coined by C. T. van Deventer in his famous article, "Een Eereschuld" 
(1899).
39. See P. McDonald, "A Historical Perspective to Population Growth in Indonesia," 
Indonesia: The Making of a Culture, ed. J. J. Fox (Canberra: Australian National 
University, 1980), esp. pp. 84-88.
40. Anne Booth, "The Burden of Taxation in Colonial Indonesia in the Twentieth 
Century," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 11, 1 (March 1980).
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traditional Java. To assess the Ethical Policy as a Development Policy is 
only to show that it was not what it was not.
Education, however, was one critical aspect in which the Ethical Policy was 
altogether untraditional. In the more recent period with which we are familiar, 
Javanese rulers never displayed much concern for the formal education of their 
subjects. Neither for many years did the colonial government. At the end of 
the nineteenth century, access to Western education was still confined for the 
most part to the sons of regents, while vernacular education was rudimentary.41 423
The significance of educational reforms under the Ethical Policy was twofold. 
First, the government accepted responsibility for "native” education in the 
form of the desa (village) school. Progress towards mass primary education 
was nevertheless very slow. «* Second, children of well-to-do Indonesian parents 
were allowed access to Dutch secondary education, with the opportunity of 
proceeding to professionally oriented tertiary education in such fields as 
medicine, law, and engineering. The aim was to produce a small Westernized 
Indonesian elite whose members could fill responsible positions in the rapidly 
growing civil service. This enlightened policy rebounded on the Dutch. Contact 
with Western liberal values made these privileged Indonesians more aware of 
the discrepancy between Dutch rule in the Netherlands and Dutch rule in the 
East Indies. At the same time, their limited career prospects highlighted 
the fact that they were s till second-class citizens in their own country. 
Their frustration became one of the wellsprings of the modern nationalist 
movement.4 *
Independence and Guided Democracy
Independence brought about a radical shift in values as the nascent Indonesian 
middle class displaced the colonial Dutch as holders of political power. 
As a result of the education policy of the late colonial era, most of the 
leaders of this nationalist revolution were in the Western liberal tradition. 
No one has put it more forcefully than J. M. van der Kroef in the early years 
of independence:
The educated elite of commoners who shaped the Indonesian Revolution 
and are now at the helm of the state are children of the French 
Revolution and of nineteenth century Liberalism. They, like their 
protagonists of 1789, directed their efforts towards the abolition 
of privilege, an end to the restrictions that hampered the full
41. The first Javanese schools dated from 1848 and were set up to train children 
of noble families as scribes and administrators. About the same time schools 
were set up to train teachers and vaccinators (dokter djawa). See Van Niel, 
Modern Indonesian E lite , pp. 26-30.
42. Ibid., pp. 68-70.
43. Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, ASAA Monograph 
(Singapore: Heinemann, 1979), points out that an early decision was made to 
exclude Indonesians from the civil service proper (Binnenlands Bestuur). 
Van Niel, Modern Indonesian E lite  (esp. pp. 180-81) refers to the decision 
not to pay Indonesians the same remuneration as Europeans in services such 
as education, credit, and irrigation where they worked side by side. John 
Ingleson, The Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement, 1927-1936, 
ASAA Monograph (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979) is a good account of the early 
nationalist movement.
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use of their economic resources, the overthrow of a political 
system which left them outside the legislative process in their 
own country and the removal of the social inequality and inhuman 
exploitation on which the colonial ancien regime rested.44 456
It was no coincidence that the government of an independent Indonesia was 
republican and democratic. In the economic sphere, however, where the Dutch 
retained their supremacy, liberalism was discredited in favor of socialism. 
Lance Castles has nicely described the circumstances which gave rise to this 
situation:
[I]t was from the small circle of the Western-educated, generally 
springing from the aristocratic and official class, that the leadership 
of the national movement and the elite  of the new state were mainly 
drawn. In this group an aristocratic contempt for commercial and 
industrial occupations combined with an intellectual attraction to 
Marxism to form a strongly anti-capitalist ideology, but one whose 
positive content differed a good deal from one individual to another.
As the commanding heights of the Netherlands Indies economy were 
already occupied by European capital, nationalist sentiment coincided 
with socialist in demanding their nationalisation. . . .  As employees 
(or potential employees and office-holders) of the state, the 
elite had every reason to favour the maximisation of its economic 
ro le.4 *
The essence of Sukarno's Marhaenist ideology was that the elite formed a single 
class with the peasants and workers. In terms of ownership of the means of 
production, there was no national bourgeoisie. Concern for the welfare of 
the common people was expressed in the principle of social justice, meaning 
economic equality, which was enshrined in the Panca Sila (Five Principles) 
and written into the Constitution.44
The abandonment of parliamentary democracy in favor of "Guided Democracy" 
and "Guided Economy" was meant to provide the conditions for realizing the 
socialist goals of the revolution. In practice, "Socialism a la Indonesia" 
involved primary emphasis upon state ownership and control. Once Dutch enterprises 
had been nationalized, however, much of the momentum was lost. The bureaucracy 
grew until it was quite bloated, but the socialist consensus did not extend as 
far as effective measures to raise the level of welfare of the people. Under 
the slogan of scmdang-pangan (food and clothing) an attempt was made through 
o ffic ia lly  sponsored cooperatives and rationing to achieve some equality in 
the distribution of basic commodities, in accordance with the Panca Sila principle 
of social ju stice .47 Because of widespread corruption and the failure of 
the cooperatives, however, distribution was implemented only for civil servants, 
thereby helping to turn the civil service into a vast relief organization.
44. Quoted in Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 
1966), pp. 750-51.
45. Lance Castles, "The Fate of the Private Entrepreneur," in Sukarno?s Guided 
Indonesia, ed. T. K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1967), p. 74.
46. See Sukarno, "The Pantja Sila" in Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965 
ed. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 
pp. 40-49.
47. See T. K. Tan, "Sukarnian Economics" in Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, pp. 29-45.
87
In theory the people were also meant to benefit from the nationalization of 
foreign enterprises, through the provision of public sector goods and services 
at heavily subsidized prices. The impact of subsidies on the budget was so 
great, however, that this attempt to reconcile state ownership with popular 
welfare was economically disastrous. The resultant huge budget deficits generated 
hyperinflation, which had a highly regressive distributional impact, at least 
in urban areas.4* Anyone with liquid capital and political connections was 
well placed to make large profits through concessions and speculation-Castles 
referred to the wry distinction between the newly rich (orang kaya baru) and 
the suddenly rich (orang kaya mendadak).** Those on fixed money incomes were 
economically annihilated. Even many civil servants faced a struggle to survive 
as the real value of their salaries and supplements fe ll more and more below 
the cost of living. Smallholder exporters, mainly in the Outer Islands, were 
heavily penalized by the multiple exchange rate regime. Ironically, however, 
the real income of food producers may have risen, not because of any socialist 
measures but because they were able to disengage themselves from the market 
economy.
Although Sukarno saw himself as the symbol of national unity, the brief 
era of Guided Democracy shattered the social consensus that had more or less 
held since independence. The rhetoric was socialist but the reality was worsening 
inequality. At the same time, Sukarno's patronage of the Communist party 
(PKI) provided a hitherto unparalleled opportunity for radical mobilization 
of the landless peasantry.48 950 By the mid-1960s there was the real possibility 
that the demise of Sukarno would allow the PKI to gain control of the government 
with the support of the first widespread peasant movement in Indonesian history. 
This would have been the ultimate vindication of Sukarno's ideal of the continuing 
revolution, albeit not one that he seems to have contemplated with any enthusiasm.
The New Order
While the events of September 30/October 1, 1965 may be described in terms 
of their outcome as a military coup, the establishment of the New Order is 
perhaps better understood as a middle-class counterrevolution. Indisputably, 
the PKI and the rural poor were the losers. To what extent the latter would 
ultimately have benefited from a Communist party victory is perhaps an open 
question, but the failure of the PKI's bid for power and its bloody extirpation 
removed all possibility of an organized peasant revolution within the foreseeable 
future. The Armed Forces were the obvious victors, since their already great 
de facto authority was formalized by martial law. Somewhat less obviously, 
an emerging middle class was also to be counted among the winners. Notwithstanding 
the phenomenal growth in the size of the bureaucracy under Guided Democracy, 
its members had for the most part suffered a marked decline in living standards,
48. The best study of the nature, causes, and effects of the inflation is 
J. A. C. Mackie, Problems of the Indonesian Inflation (Ithaca: Cornell Modern 
Indonesia Project, 1967).
49. Castles, "Fate of the Private Entrepreneur," p. 78.
50. Rex Mortimer, "Strategies of Rural Development in Indonesia: Peasant 
Mobilisation versus Technological Stimulation," in Stubborn Survivors: Dissenting 
Essays on Peasants and Third World Development by Rex Mortimer, ed. Herbert 
Feith and R. Tiffen (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash 
University, 1984).
88
and their privileges had been further threatened by the power of the PKI. 
It is no paradox that the students, who in 1966 spearheaded the movement which 
forced Sukarno to abdicate, were absorbed so easily into the New Order. In 
1966 they were not only the conscience of the emerging middle class but also 
had a strong vested interest in a system of privilege for those with education. 
Robison, however, offers a very different interpretation:
Before 1959, and even up to 1965, the intellectuals were to a 
large degree integrated in the power structure through the agency 
of the mass parties. After 1965, when hegemony was seized by 
the m ilitary, intellectuals ceased to play roles as politicians 
and were offered only those of technocrats and advisers. . . . Such 
roles o ffe r l it t le  that is attractive to people proud of their
technological, administrative and managerial competence.51
Yet this seems to be doubly wrong. First, if one talks of a middle class
rather than just intellectuals—and Robison himself defines the intellectuals 
as a class with civil servants and students—then the mass parties of the Old 
Order, despite their largely middle-class leadership, posed a serious radical 
threat to middle-class aspirations. Second, it is hardly self-evident that 
those "proud of their technological, administrative and managerial competence" 
would be dissatisfied with the roles of technocrat and adviser as opposed to 
the impotence of all but a few politicians under the Old Order. Rather than 
dismissing the inclusion of the technocrats in New Order cabinets as mere window 
dressing, it seems more helpful to see their role as the logical outcome of the 
coalition formed in 1966 between the Armed Forces and middle-class elements.52 534
The economic goals of the New Order, stability and development—meaning in
practice economic growth— also reflected this coalition. Socialism was all
but disowned.
Under the New Order the material aspirations of the middle class have been 
achieved beyond the wildest dreams of those who took to the streets in the last 
few days of the old regime. The rate of inflation was reduced from about 600 
percent in 1965-66 to 10 percent in 1969. 55 Due largely to the booming oil 
sector, which accounted for the major proportion of both the value of exports 
and of central government revenues, between 1970 and 1980 the economy maintained 
a remarkable average growth rate of about 8 percent in real terms. Even allowing 
for a population growth rate of about 2 percent, this has meant an impressive 
rise in real income per capita. The benefits have flowed disproportionately 
to the relatively small urban middle-class elite. Between 1960 and 1976 real 
expenditure per capita increased twice as rapidly in urban (40 percent) as 
in rural (20 percent) Java, and faster in Jakarta (50 percent) than in any 
other city. Moreover, the increase of 40 percent in urban per capita expenditures 
was biased heavily toward the upper expenditure quintiles. **
51. Richard Robison, "Towards a Class Analysis of the Indonesian Military 
Bureaucratic State," Indonesia 25 (April 1979): 39.
52. This is not to deny, of course, that middle-class intellectuals belonged 
to the PKI and PNI and were among the victims when these parties were suppressed. 
There was certainly no monolithic middle class.
53. S. A. Grenville, "Monetary Policy and the Formal Financial Sector," in 
Garnaut and McCawley, Indonesia: Dualism, p. 108.
54. See R. M. Sundrum and Anne Booth, "Income Distribution in Indonesia:
Trends and Determinants," in ibid.
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Observation confirms the pattern suggested by the expenditure data. The 
number of motor vehicles available for personal use—whether privately or 
government owned—has soared, and the number of motorcycles has increased 
even more dramatically. Middle-class youths are now ashamed to ride a bicycle. 
Those, who at the beginning of the New Order would already have been counted 
as part of the middle class, have been able to extend their homes or move 
into modern new housing complexes. The modest furnishings of the late 1960s 
have given way to much greater luxury, and the range of typical household 
appliances has increased to include television, stereo sets, air conditioners, 
refrigerators, and rice cookers—and now videocassette recorders. One notices 
a fashion for collecting rare birds and fish. Other signs of middle-class 
prosperity are the proliferation of hair salons (for both sexes), the preference 
for expensive hand-painted batik clothing, the wearing of imported luxury 
watches, and the greater frequency of overseas travel. In view of the ready 
availability of servants, many middle-class families, let alone those belonging 
to the military elite, are now able to enjoy a standard of living which would 
be regarded as luxurious by Western middle-class standards.
This consumer revolution has involved a good deal of superficial Westerni­
zation, sometimes referred to as the spread of "Coca-Cola culture." The press, 
radio, films, and, more recently, television, have been powerful influences. 
Being seen to be moderen, however, has been an important aspect of the culture 
of the Indonesian elite since the late colonial period. In the mestizo colonial 
culture that prevailed until the mid-nineteenth century, the largely male 
European community tended to emulate the lifestyles of the Javanese aristocracy. 
With the opening up of Java to private capital and the consolidation of a more 
European middle-class society in the late nineteenth century, a model was 
set for the lifestyle of the Indonesian middle class which emerged with the 
liberalization  of secondary and tertiary education. After independence and 
the expulsion of Dutch nationals in 1958, middle-class Indonesians simply 
took their place, occupying their homes and taking over their less portable 
possessions. Under the New Order there have been widening opportunities for 
middle-class Indonesians to mix professionally and socially with middle-class 
Westerners, both within and outside the country. This has been reflected in the 
sustained demand for English-language conversation courses. Some convergence 
of Indonesian middle-class lifestyles with those of the West is therefore 
hardly surprising.
Although Western consumer preferences have been absorbed more easily than 
Western middle-class values, in the latter case there would also seem to be 
some convergence. First, the Indonesian middle class has come to accept both 
the desirability and the possibility of steadily rising living standards. The 
commitment to development as a national priority in the early days of the 
New Order was a conscious break with the traditionally static perception of 
the economy which had been pervasive in the period of Guided Democracy. Second, 
far from being accepted as part of the natural order of society, inequality 
is increasingly being viewed as undesirable per se, as seen in the inclusion 
of "equality" (pemerataan) among the goals, however vague, of the Third Five 
Year Plan (1979-84).** Third, the middle class does not subscribe to the
55. Repelita III specified eight paths to equality (jalur pemerataan) namely:
1. Equality in fu lfillin g  people's basic needs, especially for food, 
clothing, and shelter.
2. Equality of opportunity in obtaining education and health services.
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feudal idea that each man is born to his station in life, but rather aspires 
to upward mobility on the basis of education and experience. The notions of 
merit and career, which are quintessential^ middle class, are epitomized in 
the bureaucracies of the civil service, armed forces, and business corporations. 
Whether the Indonesian middle class also displays the traditional Western 
middle-class "virtues" of hard work and thrift is another question. Fourth, 
elements of the middle class are displaying a growing concern with liberal 
ideas of democracy, the rule of law, and freedom of speech.** They are also 
more and more inclined to perceive corruption as a moral issue.
The middle-class commitment to rising living standards, equality, social 
mobility, and democratic rights does not mean, however, that these are necessarily 
to be enjoyed by all. Rather it seems that, as in George Orwell’s familiar 
phrase, some are to be more equal than others. The substance of the middle-class 
commitment to equality can best be understood in relation to the slogan of 
pola kehidupan sederhana (modest lifestyles). It is officially regarded as 
extravagant to own more than one bungalow, to have more than one car, and to 
make frequent trips abroad. No one is to be condemned, however, for having 
only one modern bungalow fitted out with such items as air conditioning, carpets, 
refrigerator, color television, and sound system, for having only one car and 
motorcycles for the children, or for making occasional trips abroad. These 
are now the "basic needs" of the middle class. It is trite to point out that, 
by contrast, few villagers or kampung dwellers have access to electricity, 
let alone being able to afford such expensive consumer durables. For many 
it is s t ill a struggle to eat properly all year round, to buy medicines if 
they fall sick, and to support their children through the nominally free state 
education system. Yet the proposition has never seriously been put forward 
that genuine equality and implementation of pola kehidupan sederhana should 
involve the urban middle class forgoing all but an adequate subsistence until 
such time as all other Indonesians are as well off. The real target of the 
slogan would seem to be not the middle class but a small elite. In terms of 
middle-class values, the lavish conspicuous consumption of high civil and 
military officials, far from being legitimized—as would traditionally have been 
the case~by proximity to the source of political power, is regarded as an abuse. 
This moral condemnation seems to be more closely allied to jealousy and envy, 
however, than to any genuine concern for the welfare of the common people.
The New Order government has nevertheless taken measures to raise the 
level of popular welfare. First and foremost, there is the rice buffer stock 
and price stabilization scheme operated since the mid-1960s by Bulog (Badan
3. Equality of income distribution.
4. Equality of employment opportunities.
5. Equality of business opportunities.
6. Equality of opportunity to participate in development, especially 
for the young generation and women.
7. Equality in the spread of development throughout the whole country.
8. Equal opportunity in obtaining justice.
These are broad goals, however, without specific guidance as to how they are 
to be achieved.
56. See especially Lev, "Origins of Indonesian Advocacy," p. 160, and also 
J. A. C. Mackie, "Indonesia Since 1945— Problems of Interpretation," in 
Interpreting Indonesian Politics, ed. Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (Ithaca: 
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982), p. 129.
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Urusan Logistik), the Logistics Affairs Agency.*7 This has very effectively 
cushioned consumers against large price rises due to harvest failure. Because 
Bulog’s policies work through the market for rice, however, they do not provide 
a means of supplementing the subsistence of people who are so poor that they 
lack the purchasing power to buy sufficient rice. Only very occasionally, 
in the case of localized outbreaks of severe famine, has rice been distributed 
on the basis of need. The same applies to policies to stabilize the prices 
of other of the nine basic commodities (bahan pokok)—-salted fish, cooking 
oil, sugar, salt, kerosene, soap, and low-grade textiles.** In the case of 
kerosene there has been a very large subsidy,** while in many cities there 
has also been a considerable subsidy of public transport bus fares. While 
all of these subsidies have helped to reduce the cost of living, the distribution 
of benefits has been biased in two ways. First, the benefits have flowed 
disproportionately to those living in the large cities—there are good political 
reasons why the government should fear urban "rice riots." Second, because 
the amount of subsidy received is proportional to the amount of the good consumed, 
much of the benefit of consumer subsidies has flowed to the urban middle class. 
The urban middle class have also tended to be the prime beneficiaries of government 
housing programs, which had been directed mainly towards the needs of civil 
servants and, perhaps to a lesser extent, of clinics set up under the family 
planning and health programs. Although the New Order government might appear 
to be pursuing the elements of a "basic needs" strategy, overall there seems 
to be little  evidence of redistribution away from the urban middle class.
One way of pursuing equality without any redistribution of wealth and income 
is to redefine equality in terms of equality of opportunity. The opportunity is 
for the poor peasant or coolie to rise up into the middle class. The means to 
that end is education, to which the New Order government has now given top 
priority. In the 1982-83 development budget, education was the largest single 
item. This expenditure is directed toward ultimately achieving universal primary 
education, as well as toward a big expansion in junior high school enrollments. 
In itself this is almost certainly a good thing. It does not follow, however, 
that the outcome will indeed be equality of opportunity. First, in the absence 
of positive discrimination, poor parents cannot afford to support their children 
as dependents through six years of higher education, even if they could afford 
the outlays for books, uniforms, and excursions, the unofficial entrance fees, 
and the variety of other legal and illegal levies. Second, it is the old fallacy 
of misplaced aggregation to assume that, because education allows some individuals 
to become upwardly mobile, it will therefore allow a whole lower class to seize 
a very limited range of employment opportunities. Nevertheless, historically 
education has been the main channel of upward mobility, and income is still 
highly correlated with the level of education.*0 The argument is therefore 
sufficiently plausible and the grounds for believing it so appealing, that 
peasant and working-class parents may well aspire to middle-class materialism 
for their children, rather than seek to overthrow middle-class rule for a
57. See Leon A. Mears and Sidik Moeljono, "Food Policy," in The Indonesian 
Economy during the Soeharto Era, ed. Anne Booth and Peter McCawley (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1981).
58. These are basically the sandang-pangan commodities of the Sukarno period.
59. See Howard Dick, "The Oil Price Subsidy, Deforestation and Equity," Bulletin 
of Indonesian Economic Studies 16, 3 (November 1980).
60. See Sundrum and Booth, "Income Distribution in Indonesia."
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socialist ideal of genuine equality. On the other hand, there is clear evidence 
that the rate of open unemployment is highly correlated with the level of 
education, and the rate can be expected to worsen as educational opportunities 
widen. This problem has already given rise to political tensions in some 
other developing countries, most notably Sri Lanka. It would be ironic if, 
by the rapid development of education, the New Order were to sow the seeds 
of its own destruction at the hands of discontented middle-class youth.*1
Conclusion
The middle-class revolution that began in Indonesia in the 1920s may yet 
be a victory for bourgeois democracy, but this could be little  cause for rejoicing 
on the part of the people. The post-independence history of India—and, until 
martial law, of the Philippines—shows how unresponsive a prosperous middle-class 
democracy can be to mass poverty.*1 Paradoxically, the smaller the threat 
of popular revolution, the more favorable are the conditions for the emergence 
of middle-class democracy from military rule, but the weaker the pressures 
for any significant redistribution of wealth and income at the expense of 
the middle class. Although a growing concern for equality may be expressed 
more and more in Western middle-class terms, in practice the common people 
are unlikely to be the beneficiaries. Relative inequality can be expected 
to increase as economic growth increases the size of the economic surplus 
distributed among the middle class. Absolute poverty could also worsen if 
an emerging rural elite of rich farmers and of absentee landlords were to 
introduce modern capital-intensive farm technology and thereby displace labor 
at a faster rate than can be absorbed in manufacturing, construction, or services.
In terms of development policy, there seems to be a great historical irony. 
Since the mid-1970s the Western concern with Third World poverty has at last 
been translated into human terms in the form of a "basic needs" strategy for 
economic development. In Indonesia this ought to correspond very closely with 
the traditional Javanese perception of an adequate subsistence (cukupan). Yet 
it has struck no resonant chord. The reason would seem to be that the middle 
class now dominates articulate society, and government no longer acknowledges 
a popular right to an adequate subsistence. A rhetoric of equality is being 
translated into some efforts to ensure equality of opportunity and to facilitate 
upward mobility, but "devil take the hindmost." No general improvement in 
popular welfare is likely until growth has been sustained for long enough 
to create a permanent shortage of unskilled rural labor and usher in an era 
of rising real wages.
61. As argued above, it was probably the most enlightened element of the 
Ethical Policy, namely the extension of Western liberal education to a small 
Indonesian elite, that stimulated the nationalist movement and hastened the 
end of colonial rule.
62. Of course, the Emergency in India and Martial Law in the Philippines 
do not seem to have had any greater impact upon mass poverty, notwithstanding 
all the rhetoric.
